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for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
  
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _____________________ 
 
HUYETT, District Judge: 
 Appellant Dennis Felton was a tax examining assistant 
with the Automated Collection Service ("ACS") of the Internal 
Revenue Service ("IRS").  He was responsible for, among other 
things, contacting taxpayers with regard to collecting delinquent 
income tax payments.  Felton offered delinquent taxpayers the 
opportunity to settle tax debts with the IRS for personal 
payments to him.  He was convicted of one count of demand and 
acceptance of a bribe by a public official and five counts of 
unlawful gratuity demanded and sought by a public official.   
 Felton appeals his sentence on three grounds.  First, 
Felton argues that the district court erred in adjusting his 
offense level upward by two levels pursuant to United States 
Sentencing Guideline section 3B1.1 for being a leader, organizer, 
manager, or supervisor of a criminal activity.  Second, he argues 
that the district court erred in departing from the Sentencing 
Guidelines to make a one-level upward adjustment.  Third, he 
argues that the district court made a mathematical error in its 
computation of his offense level that caused it to find him 
ineligible for a decrease in his offense level authorized by 
section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  We agree with 
Felton's third contention and vacate the district court's 
judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.   
 I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
  
   In early September 1992, while working for the IRS, 
Felton received a telephone call from a Colonia, New Jersey 
taxpayer concerning approximately $22,000 she owed in taxes in 
connection with her 1990 Form 1040.  In response to her inquiry 
as to whether she could be excused from penalties and interest on 
the money she owed, Felton telephoned her and told her that if 
she paid him, he would "take care of business."  He arranged a 
meeting at a mall in New Jersey, where he told her that in 
exchange for a personal payment of $8,000, he would close the 
collection action, abate all penalties and interest, and arrange 
for the return of approximately $13,000 to her.  Subsequently, 
she contacted the IRS Office of the Regional Inspector concerning 
this incident and participated in a controlled investigation.  At 
an October 6, 1992 meeting, the taxpayer paid Felton $2000 and 
Felton told her that he wanted to receive the balance of the 
bribe payment when she received the refund check.  The ACS 
received a return with falsified information, and in June 1993, 
the taxpayer received a refund check for $24,805.44.  Felton was 
arrested on July 14, 1993 after he demanded and received the 
remaining $6,000 payment. 
 On Felton's arrest, he advised the authorities that his 
co-worker, Walter Clark, actually amended the return for the 
taxpayer and that Clark was to share equally in the payments.   
Felton needed Clark or some other person to participate in the 
schemes because Felton is legally blind and cannot alter tax 
returns alone.  Following Felton's arrest, agents reviewed the 
files Felton and Clark handled and investigated the five other 
  
frauds for which Felton was convicted.  With Felton's 
cooperation, the authorities investigated Clark's involvement in 
the schemes and prosecuted him for his involvement in one fraud.   
 In the five incidents for which Felton was convicted of 
demanding a gratuity, Felton sought payments to prepare tax 
returns or resolve tax penalties or other tax problems.  In some 
instances, he offered to reduce their individual tax liabilities 
and generate refunds in exchange for payments to him.  In other 
instances, he solicited taxpayers by offering to amend their 
income tax returns and cause refunds to issue in exchange for 
payments to him.  In several instances, he demanded and took 
money from taxpayers without performing services.  In two frauds, 
involving taxpayers from Englewood, New Jersey and Mount Holly, 
New Jersey, Felton contacted taxpayers after they called the IRS 
to resolve their tax problems.  The Mount Holly taxpayers later 
referred Felton as a tax adviser to their friends and relatives, 
which led to frauds against taxpayers in Burlington Township, New 
Jersey, Williamstown, New Jersey, and Budd Lake, New Jersey.  The 
Mount Holly, Burlington Township, Williamstown, and Budd Lake 
taxpayers claimed that they did not know Felton was an IRS agent.   
 On April 22, 1994, Felton entered a guilty plea to an 
information charging him with one count of "demand and acceptance 
of bribe by public official," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
201(b)(2), and five counts of "unlawful gratuity demanded and 
sought by public official," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
201(c)(1)(B).  A sentencing hearing was held on July 11, 1994.  
In the judgment, subsequently filed on July 20, 1994, the 
  
district court adopted the factual findings and Guideline 
applications in the Presentence Investigation Report 
("presentence report" or "PSR") except for three paragraphs.  
App. 115 (Judgment, July 20, 1994).  Thus, the record reviewed 
includes the presentence report, the court's oral explanation of 
its decision at the hearing, and the judgment order.   
 At the sentencing hearing, the district court 
calculated a base offense level of ten, pursuant to section 
2C1.1, "Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; 
Extortion Under Color of Official Right."  As recommended in the 
presentence report, pursuant to subsection 3B1.1(c), the court 
raised the offense level by two levels because Felton played an 
aggravating role in the offense.  The court also considered the 
specific offense characteristics provisions of section 2C1.1(b).  
First, the court adopted the probation office's calculation of a 
$31,295.44 loss attributable to Felton and increased the offense 
level by four levels because the aggregate harm exceeded $20,000, 
pursuant to subsection 2C.1.1(b)(2).  Second, the district court 
rejected the probation officer's calculations and agreed with 
Felton that although the Guidelines authorized a two-level 
increase for multiple gratuities or multiple bribes, the 
Guidelines did not authorize an increase when there was just one 
bribe, but multiple gratuities.  The court, however, used 
Felton's argument to depart from the Guidelines to increase the 
offense level by one level.  Next, although the presentence 
report recommended a three-level decrease for acceptance of 
responsibility pursuant to section 3E1.1, the court granted only 
  
a two-level decrease.  The court believed that by not imposing 
the two-level increase for multiple bribes, the offense level 
prior to the operation of subsection 3E1.1(a) was 15, and not 16 
or greater, which would have permitted another decrease in 
offense level for timely providing information concerning 
involvement in offense or timely notifying authorities of his 
intention to enter a plea of guilty.  Finally, the district court 
granted a one-level downward departure, following the 
government's section 5K1.1 motion.    
 In summary, the district court's modification of the 
presentence report yielded an offense level of 14.  The following 
calculation reflects the order in which the offense level should 
be calculated, pursuant to the application instructions of 
section 1B1.1:   
   Base offense level, § 2C1.1(a)      10 
   Specific offense characteristics, § 2C1.1(b) 
   More than one gratuity or bribe    0 
 Aggregate harm more than $20,000    + 4 
   Aggravating role in the offense, § 3B1.1(c)  + 2 
   Acceptance of responsibility, § 3E1.1(a)   - 2 
   Additional adjustment for acceptance of  
 responsibility, § 3E1.1(b)    0 
   Upward Departure from § 2C1.1    + 1 
   Downward departure, § 5K1.1                     - 1 
   Total Offense Level =       14  
For an offense level of 14, the Guidelines prescribe a sentence 
within the range of 15 to 21 months.  USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A.  The 
district court sentenced Felton to 15 months on the bribery 
charge and 15 months on each of the gratuities charges, each to 
be served concurrently. 
 II.  Discussion 
  
 We have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal from 
the final decision of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  The district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this 
criminal matter.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We review the district 
court's factual findings in relation to sentencing issues for 
clear error.  United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 447 (3d Cir. 
1994); United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 964 (3d Cir. 1992).  A 
finding is clearly erroneous, if, after reviewing all of the 
evidence, we are left with the firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made.  Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 969.  Our review with respect 
to the district court's application and interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines is plenary.  Id. at 964; United States v. 
Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Murillo, 
933 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1991).  When the application of the 
Guidelines presents a mixed question of law and fact, "our 
standard and scope of review takes on greater scrutiny, 
approaching de novo as the issue moves from one of strictly fact 
to one of strictly law."  Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 964 (quoting 
Murillo, 933 F.2d at 198). 
A.  Adjustment for Aggravating Role 
 We first address Felton's argument that the district 
court's two-level increase for Felton's aggravating role in the 
offense was in err.  The pertinent portion of section 3B1.1 of 
the Guidelines provides:   
 Based on the defendant's role in the offense, 
increase the offense level as follows: . . . 
(c) If the defendant was an organizer, 
  
leader, manager, or supervisor in any 
criminal activity other than described in (a) 
or (b), increase by 2 levels.   
USSG § 3B1.1.1  Section 3B1.1 requires the district court to find 
that "the defendant exercised control over at least one other 
person."  United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1402 (3d Cir. 
1992).  See also USSG § 3B1.1, comment. (n.2) ("the defendant 
must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of 
one or more other participants").  
 Felton takes issue with the district court's 
determination that he was a leader in criminal activity.  This 
determination is essentially factual, therefore, we reverse the 
district court only if its conclusion was clearly erroneous.  
Fields, 39 F.3d at 447; United States v. Phillips, 959 F.2d 1187, 
1191 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 497, 121 
L. Ed. 2d 434 (1992); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 127 
(3d Cir. 1989).   
 The presentence report mentions Clark in connection 
with three of the six incidents for which Felton was convicted, 
although Clark was only charged with and convicted of one fraud.  
Neither Felton nor the government objected to the facts as 
presented by the probation office with regard to these three 
incidents.  With regard to the bribery concerning the Colonia 
taxpayer, Felton offered to arrange the return of taxes she 
                     
1
.  Subsections (a) and (b) concern situations where the 
defendant was a leader, organizer, manager, or supervisor of 
criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was 
otherwise extensive. 
  
already paid to the IRS for a personal payment to him, Felton 
requested that the check be payable to him, and Felton requested 
documentation relating to her mortgage, sale of her home, and her 
profit sharing plan.  Felton also scheduled meetings with her and 
agreed to adjust her current and past tax returns, Felton told 
the taxpayer how to make payments, and Felton personally accepted 
$6,000 in cash from the taxpayer.  Clark, along with Felton and 
other Tax Examining Assistants, extended her account suspension.  
Clark also amended the taxpayer's income tax return, received 
$1,000 for this service, and Felton promised him another $3,000 
after payment of the balance owed by her.   
 With respect to the Englewood taxpayer, Felton's first 
contact with the taxpayer was through the IRS toll free telephone 
number.  Felton later contacted her to assist her with her tax 
problems, Felton requested money in exchange for purported 
services, and Felton received payments from this taxpayer.  Clark 
only attended meetings at her residence with Felton.   
 With respect to the Mount Holly taxpayers, after the 
taxpayers had made numerous telephone contacts with IRS 
representatives, Felton contacted them.  He told them that he 
could prepare and submit their income tax returns using 
information they provided, Felton denied that any illegality was 
involved, and Felton was paid by the taxpayers.  According to the 
presentence report, Clark met one of the taxpayers with Felton, 
amended the tax return, and got some portion of the payment 
received by Felton.   
  
 The probation officer summarized their involvement and 
offenses as follows:   
   26.  Felton made all initial and subsequent 
contacts with the victim's [sic] of this 
offense.  He made preliminary judgments as to 
feasibility of amending their returns, and 
made the arrangements to gather necessary 
information from the victims to be used in 
amending the returns.  He solicited the 
assistance of Walter Clark, who was 
responsible for amending some or all of the 
returns, in exchange for payment by Felton, 
and presumably provided Clark with the 
information necessary for amendment.  
Pursuant to 3B1.1(c), Felton was the 
organizer of the offense. 
 
 27.  Clark's role was in assistance to 
Felton, such as transporting Felton to 
meetings with the victims, and taking notes 
during the meetings.  While Clark was 
responsible for actually amending the returns 
themselves, his assistance was solicited by 
Felton, by whom Clark was paid.  Pursuant to 
3B1.2(b), Clark was a minor participant in 
the offense. 
PSR ¶¶ 26-27.  Neither party specifically objected to these 
paragraphs, although they both objected to the probation 
officer's characterization of Felton as an organizer in other 
parts of the presentence report.  The court, however, considered 
Felton the leader, stating:   
 There is no question that he should get the 
two point enhancement under 3B1.1(c).  Mr. 
Felton's sentence should reflect his conduct 
without reference to whatever sentence Clark 
got and why.  Under 3B1.1(c), Mr. Felton in 
my judgment was clearly the organizer, 
leader, manager of this criminal activity.  
He recruited Clark and, I suggest, others. 
App. at 85 (Transcript).   
  
 "When a person manages or supervises another in the 
course of a criminal enterprise, the manager or supervisor will 
normally be more culpable than the person managed or supervised."  
United States v. Fuentes, 954 F.2d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1992).  "The 
direction and control of others is a recurrent theme in legal 
definitions of the terms 'manager' and 'supervisor.'"  United 
States v. King, 21 F.3d 1302, 1305 (3d Cir. 1994).  The record 
supporting the district court's conclusion that Felton was the 
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor is not extensive, 
especially considering that at the sentencing, neither the 
prosecution nor the defense thought the increase was appropriate.  
However, several uncontested facts in the presentence report do 
tend to support the district court's conclusion that Felton 
played a supervisory role over Clark.  First, Felton made all 
initial contacts with the victims of the fraud.  Second, Clark 
performed much of the menial work of the scheme:  he drove Felton 
to meetings with the victims, he took notes during those 
meetings, and he was given the responsibility of amending the 
victims' tax returns.  While Felton's blindness -- and inability 
to perform these tasks -- no doubt diminishes the import of those 
tasks to determining Clark's role, we think that they do evidence 
the fact that Felton had at least some authority over Clark to 
have Clark do his bidding.  Finally, the fact that Felton was 
involved in more incidents than Clark supports the district 
court's conclusion that it was Felton's scheme to begin with and 
that Felton "recruited Clark" to work for him.  The evidence 
concerning their individual roles in the offense was sufficient 
  
record evidence for the district court to conclude that Felton 
was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor, even though 
Clark did not participate in every scheme.  The district court's 
finding was not clearly erroneous. 
B.  Departure from the Guidelines  
 We next consider Felton's argument that the district 
court erred in departing from the Sentencing Guidelines to adjust 
his offense level upward by one level.  Generally, the district 
court must sentence a defendant within the applicable guideline 
range.  However, when "the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, 
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described" the court may depart from 
the guideline range.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).  See also United 
States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1408 (3d Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir. 1990). 
  We review the district court's decision according to 
the model set forth in United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084.  
First, we determine whether the circumstances upon which the 
district court relied to justify the departure were adequately 
considered by the Sentencing Commission.  This requires a two-
fold inquiry:  we exercise plenary review over the district 
court's determination that the Guidelines do not adequately take 
a particular factor into consideration, Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 
1098, and we apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to 
determine whether the facts support the sentencing court's 
  
rationale.  United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1287 (3d Cir. 
1994); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098.  Second, we must determine 
whether the sentence imposed was reasonable.  This also demands a 
two-fold inquiry:  we consider whether the factors on which the 
court relied were appropriate and whether the degree of departure 
was appropriate.  United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  In this determination, we permit the district courts 
to exercise a substantial amount of discretion.  Bertoli, 40 F.3d 
at 1408; Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098.  We address each issue in 
turn.   
 1.  Adequate Consideration by the Sentencing Commission 
 We must first determine whether the Sentencing 
Commission took adequate consideration of the aggravating 
circumstance upon which the district court relied.  In this case, 
the factual basis for departure was not disputed.  The district 
court found that Felton accepted one bribe and five gratuities.  
The district court reasoned that the magnitude of Felton's 
schemes was an aggravating factor that the Sentencing Commission 
did not adequately consider.  
 The district court is permitted to examine only the 
Sentencing Guidelines, the policy statements, and the official 
commentary of the Guidelines to determine whether the Sentencing 
Commission adequately considered this aggravating factor.  18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1104.2   
                     
2
.  To minimize confusion in the arguments Felton advances, we 
briefly explain the Guideline sections applied.  The Sentencing 
Guidelines require the district court to group together all 
counts involving substantially the same harm.  USSG § 3D1.2.  The 
  
 Section 2C1.1 requires a two-level increase in offense 
level, "[i]f the offense involved more than one bribe or 
extortion."  USSG § 2C1.1(b)(1).  Section 2C1.2, which would have 
applied had their been no bribes, requires a two-level increase 
"[i]f the offense involved more than one gratuity."  USSG § 
2C1.2(b)(1).  The Guidelines, the policy statements, and the 
official commentary of the Sentencing Commission do not mention 
that an increase is available to raise the offense level for one 
bribe and multiple gratuities.  See § 2C1.1(b)(1).   
 The court's analysis of this issue was not extensive.  
While making objections to the presentence report, Felton's 
counsel argued that the Guidelines do not permit the court to 
aggregate one bribe with multiple gratuities to increase the 
offense level by two levels because then the gratuities would be 
treated as bribes.  The court appeared to accept this argument 
and used this argument to justify its departure from the 
Guidelines.  An exchange concerning this issue was as follows:  
 MR. KELLER:  I'm saying that it's totally 
improper to start aggregating one bribe with 
certain gratuities and lump all these 
gratuities, all of a sudden to become bribes. 
. . . 
 
 THE COURT:  Well, suppose I don't give him 
those two points.  Look, at the rate you're 
going I'm going to have to give him a 
present. 
(..continued) 
counts of bribery and gratuities must be grouped together.  § 
3D1.2(d).  Because these counts involve offenses of the same 
general type, the court must apply the offense guideline that 
produces the highest offense level.  § 3D1.3(b).  Because the 
bribery provision, § 2C1.1, produces a higher offense level than 
the gratuity provision, § 2C1.2, the bribery guideline is used. 
  
  You know, I'm not going to buy this 
argument, though I'll tell you I am not going 
to not count five counts on which he accepted 
an illegal gratuity.  So even if you're right 
on the law here, it would certainly be an 
appropriate ground for an upward departure.  
Right?  You couldn't disagree with that. 
 
 MR. KELLER:  Well -- 
 
 THE COURT:  Because this is conduct which 
would not otherwise be counted.  So I mean I 
don't know, which way do you want me to go on 
that?   
App. at 78-79 (Transcript).  After a recess, the court explained 
its departure from the Guidelines as follows: 
   I am going to grant Mr. Keller's objection to 
the -- what is it, 2C1.1 bribery or extortion 
language.  This is very complicated.  I think 
I could make an argument that because one is 
referred under the gratuity statute to 2C1.1, 
and that language of bribery or extortion, 
that perhaps Mr. Keller's argument should be 
rejected.  But I'm not clear enough on it to 
say.  It is just too murky.  So I'm going to 
take off those two points. 
  That does not quite end the issue 
though.  Because by taking off those two 
points, Mr. Felton is no longer eligible for 
the additional point on acceptance of 
responsibility.  Because he's down into a -- 
what's it, a 15 instead of a 16.  So all of 
that having been said, that's not to say Mr. 
Keller, because I told you I would, I'm going 
to give you the two points on that particular 
objection.  But I will upward depart and I 
will upward depart one level to compensate 
for the one level that is being lost on the 
acceptance of responsibility, third point. 
App. at 85-86 (emphasis added) (Transcript).   
 In the judgment order, the court explained its basis 
for the upward departure as follows: 
  
 Because one bribery and five gratuities were 
not aggregated to receive the 2 level 
increase under 2C1.1, the gratuities would 
not be punished absent an upward departure, a 
circumstance not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Commission. 
App. at 114 (Judgment).   
 We reject Felton's argument that the multiple count 
provisions, found in Chapter Three, Part D of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, make clear that the Sentencing Commission considered 
the impact of multiple count convictions on the sentencing 
process and believed that certain offenses were so closely 
intertwined that they should not receive any increase under the 
Guidelines.  As explained by the Sentencing Commission in its 
introductory commentary to the multiple count provisions:  
 Some offense guidelines, such as those for 
theft, fraud and drug offenses, contain 
provisions that deal with repetitive or 
ongoing behavior.  Other guidelines, such as 
those for assault and robbery, are oriented 
more toward single episodes of criminal 
behavior.  Accordingly, different rules are 
required for dealing with multiple-count 
convictions involving these two different 
general classes of offenses.  
USSG Ch. 3, Pt. D, intro. comment.  The Sentencing Commission 
explicitly authorized a two-level increase in offense level for 
multiple bribes in section 2C1.1 and a similar increase for 
multiple unlawful gratuities in section 2C1.2.  Thus, despite the 
multiple count provisions, the Sentencing Commission approved an 
increase in offense level for multiple bribes or gratuities, as 
compared to single instances of a bribe or a gratuity.   
  
  The Sentencing Commission authorized an increase in 
offense level for six bribes or six gratuities, but not for a 
combination of one bribe and five gratuities.  The Sentencing 
Guidelines, the commentary, and the background notes do not 
indicate that the Sentencing Commission believed that this type 
of repeated unlawful conduct involving a bribe and gratuities 
should be treated less harshly than repeated unlawful conduct 
involving only bribes or only gratuities.  Thus, it appears that 
the Sentencing Commission did not consider this result. 
 2.  Reasonableness of the Adjustment 
  We also must consider whether the district court's 
upward adjustment was reasonable.  Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1110.  
Review is deferential.  Id. at 1098.  To determine whether the 
sentence was reasonable, we consider the factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the reasons for the imposition of the 
particular sentence as stated by the district court, pursuant to 
section 3553(c).  18 U.S.C. § 3742 (Review of a sentence); 
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098.  We consider "whether the factors 
relied on are appropriate; and whether the degree of departure 
was appropriate."  Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098 (internal 
quotations omitted).  "In order to be 'appropriate,' a factor 
occasioning or contributing to an upward departure must be 
relevant to the defendant's culpability."  United States v. 
Schweitzer, 5 F.3d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 The factors upon which the court relied were 
appropriate.  The fact that Felton accepted multiple gratuities 
is relevant to his culpability because the Sentencing Guidelines 
  
already meted increased punishment for public officials who 
accepted multiple bribes or multiple gratuities.  To sentence 
pursuant to the Guidelines would have been equivalent to 
sentencing Felton for one bribe greater than $20,000 without 
reflecting the multitude of gratuities demanded or accepted.  
Furthermore, the degree of departure was appropriate.  The 
increase in the offense level was no greater than the increase 
that would have been required for acceptance of two gratuities, 
had there been no bribery charges.  Thus, we find no error in the 
court's upward departure.     
 C.  Reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility 
 Finally, we consider Felton's argument that the 
district court erred in its computation of his offense level, 
which caused the district court to find him ineligible for a 
third decrease in his offense level which was authorized by 
section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  The district court 
decreased Felton's offense level by two levels, pursuant to 
subsection 3E1.1(a).  Felton argues that he should have received 
an additional one-level decrease pursuant to subsection 3E1.1(b).  
Section 3E1.1 provides as follows: 
 (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates 
acceptance of responsibility for his offense, 
decrease the offense level by 2 levels. 
 
 (b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease 
under subsection (a), the offense level 
determined prior to the operation of 
subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and 
the defendant has assisted authorities in the 
investigation or prosecution of his own 
misconduct by taking one or more of the 
following steps: 
  
  (1) timely providing complete 
information to the government concerning 
his own involvement in the offense; or 
  (2) timely notifying authorities of his 
intention to enter a plea of guilty, 
thereby permitting the government to 
avoid preparing for trial and permitting 
the court to allocate its resources 
efficiently,  
 decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. 
USSG § 3E1.1.  The district court is particularly well suited to 
evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility.  Therefore, 
its determination can only be reversed if we find it was clearly 
erroneous.  United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1193 (3d Cir. 
1994).  
 Felton argues that the district court failed to grant 
him a reduction of one level pursuant to subsection 3E1.1(b) 
because it thought that he had an offense level of only 15 
instead of 16.  The transcript of the sentencing hearing and the 
ensuing judgment support this argument.  Prior to the operation 
of subsection 1B1.1(a), Felton's offense level was sixteen, based 
on a base offense level of ten, a four-level increase for loss 
greater than $20,000, and a two-level increase for Felton's role 
as organizer.  The court, however, said with respect to this 
issue:   
 [B]y taking off those two points, Mr. Felton 
is no longer eligible for the additional 
point on acceptance of responsibility.  
Because he's down into a -- what's it, a 15 
instead of a 16.  So all of that having been 
said, that's not to say Mr. Keller, because I 
told you I would, I'm going to give you the 
two points on that particular objection. 
  
App. at 107 (Transcript).  The court repeated this reasoning in 
the judgment as follows: 
 2C1.1 states that if the offense involved 
more than one "bribe or extortion" increase 
by 2 levels.  The offense here involved one 
bribe and five gratuities.  Because it is 
unclear whether this aggregate behavior can 
receive the 2 level increase, the two level 
increase was deleted.  As a result, the 
additional adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility in paragraph 46 was deleted as 
well. 
App. at 115 (Judgment).  The court's explanation was clear 
error.3   The government argues that Felton was not granted the 
additional one-level reduction because the district court could 
have made independent findings of fact that Felton failed to 
assist authorities.  The district court, however, never made any 
such findings.  The only evidence of Felton's failure to assist 
that the government can find is an offhand remark by the 
government's counsel that Felton embellished certain facts 
surrounding the offense in the course of aiding the authorities.  
                     
3
.  The government maintains that Felton never objected to the 
district court's refusal to give a three-level reduction and 
accordingly waived his right to appeal unless the mistake was 
plain error.  United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 88 (3d Cir. 
1992) (sentencing disputes reviewed for plain error where 
defendant fails to object in the district court but finding that 
the miscalculation in that case was plain error), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2332, 124 L. Ed.2d 244 (1993).  Under a 
plain error standard, the court is concerned only with errors 
that seriously affect substantial rights or compromise the 
fairness of the proceedings.  Id.  This circuit and others have 
found that the miscalculation of a defendant's offense level 
"certainly is error that seriously affect[s] [the defendant's] 
rights, and so amounts to plain error."  Id. at 90; United States 
v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 553 (6th Cir. 1993) (application of clearly 
incorrect base level offense deemed clear error); United States 
v. Plaza-Garza, 914 F.2d 345, 348 (1st Cir. 1990). 
  
The district court never referred to this comment, nor did it 
explicitly find that Felton failed to assist.  The district 
court's reason for denying the third offense level decrease for 
acceptance of responsibility was clear error.  We remand the case 
for resentencing on this issue. 
 III.  Conclusion  
 In summary, we hold that the district court's reason 
for denying an additional decrease for acceptance of 
responsibility was clear error.  The court did not err, however, 
in finding that Felton was a leader, organizer, manager, or 
supervisor, nor did the court err in departing upward one level 
in sentencing Felton.  Accordingly, we will vacate the district 
court's judgment and order of sentence and remand with 
instructions for the district court to resentence Felton in 
accord with this opinion. 
